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To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Other Interested Persons
Attached hereto is the first annual report of the
Public Oversight Board covering its activities from the
first meeting in March 1978 through March 31, 1979. Since
this is the Board's first annual report, it reviews and
comments on the purpose and structure of the SEC Practice
Section of which the Board is a part, in addition to
reporting on the organization and activities of the Board
itself.
The Board's first year was devoted principally to
(1) organizing, defining its role and recruiting its staff,
(2) advising on policy matters during the development of
the Section's peer review program, (3) monitoring initial
peer reviews, (4) studying the question of the scope of
services provided by CPA firms and preparing and publishing
a report containing recommendations on the subject, and
(5) considering the question of what action should be taken
by the Section in the event of an alleged or possible audit
failure involving one of its member firms.
In the course of this work a number of formal Board
meetings were held, and the Board or one or more of its
members or staff met on numerous occasions with the Executive
Committee and various officers and staff members of the
Section. The Board also held a two-day public hearing on
the scope of services question and received written comments
from a substantial number of firms and individuals interested
in the matter. On two occasions members of the Board
testified before a Congressional subcommittee. In addition,
members of the Board and its staff held two meetings with
Chairman Williams, Commissioner Pollack, Chief Accountant
Sampson and various members of the staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and members of the Board's staff
held numerous conferences with members of the Commission's
staff. As part of the Board's oversight program, a member
of the Board attended the exit conference for each 1978 peer
review involving a major firm.
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Based upon experience to date, the Board has concluded
that its own organization and authority are sufficient to
enable it to carry out its oversight role and effectively
contribute to and assist the profession in instituting and
maintaining a vigorous and exacting self-regulatory system.
The Board also has concluded that a well-considered structure
for self-regulation of accounting firms has been initiated
by the accounting profession. Perhaps the most important
element of that structure, the mandatory peer review program,
is in place and has started to function effectively. The
Board recognizes, of course, that as experience is gained
some procedures may be modified and improved. Moreover, the
Board believes that the Section is in the process of dealing
effectively with other major issues, including the scope of
services issue and the question of the Section's role with
respect to alleged or possible audit failures.
The Board believes that, due to the substantial progress
to date, the strong commitment of the profession and the
encouragement and support of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Section's program of self-regulation will
be effective. Moreover, the Board believes that, as a matter
of principle, self-regulation is preferable to additional
governmental regulation and that every effort should be made
to assure the success of the Section's program.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

John J. McCloy
Chairman
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Public Oversight Board
SEC PRACTICE SECTION
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

ANNUAL REPORT
1978 - 1979
This is the first annual report of the Public
Oversight Board ("Board") covering its activities from the
first meeting in March 1978 through March 31, 1979. Since
this is the Board’s first annual report, it reviews and com
ments on the purpose and structure of the Section of which
the Board is a part, in addition to reporting on the organi
zation and activities of the Board itself.
I.

THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
A.

Organization

During the last three years, some members of Con
gress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (”SEC”)
have expressed concern regarding the accountability of pub
licly owned corporations and their auditors. Attention has
been focused on the manner in which the accounting profes
sion is regulated and disciplined. In response, the Council
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("Institute”) took the initiative in September 1977 by
establishing the Division for CPA Firms ("Division”), com
prised of an SEC Practice Section ("Section”) and a Private
Companies Practice Section, to implement a program of volun
tary self-regulation and self-disciplining of the profession
by establishing requirements for practice by member firms
and by creating the authority to impose sanctions for fail
ure to comply with such requirements. Some members of Con
gress expressed doubt regarding the efficacy of the profes
sion’s program of self-regulation and on June 16, 1978, Con
gressman Moss introduced legislation1/ to create a regula
tory
organization for accountants patterned after the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
However,
1/

HR 13175, A Bill to Establish a National Organization
of Securities and Exchange Commission Accountancy,
95th Congress, 2nd Sess.
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the SEC, in its 1978 Report to Congress2/ ("SEC 1978 Report
to Congress") concluded that progress during the preceding
year had been "sufficient to merit continued opportunity for
the profession to pursue its efforts at self-regulation" and
that the SEC would not recommend the adoption of legislation
"to supersede or control self-regulation of accountants at
this time."
Prior to September 1977, the Institute, which is a
professional association with some 144,000 individual CPA
members, was not structured to regulate the activities of
CPA firms. The Division now provides the organizational
structure for regulating the activities of member firms.
The creation of the Division has been the subject of litiga
tion; recently, however, a court rejected the challenge by
certain individual members to the procedures by which the
Division was established.3/ As of March 31, 1979, 550 firms
were members of the Section and 1,484 firms were members of
the Private Companies Practice Section (517 firms were mem
bers of both Sections). While the membership requirements
and program of the Section are designed specifically for CPA
firms that audit companies whose securities are required to
be registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("SEC clients"), 340 member firms have no SEC
clients.
Some concern had been expressed in the SEC 1978
Report to Congress (p. 18) as to the ability of the Insti
tute to regulate CPA firms effectively, since membership in
the Section is not mandatory. As indicated in the discus
sion of the peer review program (pages 13 and 14), a very
high percentage of SEC reporting companies are audited by
members of the Section, and the Section is studying methods
for encouraging nonmember firms to join the Section.
It is
expected that the importance of membership in the Section
will cause issuers, lenders and others who employ auditors
or rely on audited financial statements of SEC clients to
view less favorably CPA firms that do not participate in the
programs of the Section.
Nevertheless, the Board shares the SEC's and the
profession's concerns about the number of firms that audit
SEC clients which are not members of the Section and be
lieves that the Section should make every effort to increase
the membership to provide the greatest possible coverage.

2/

The Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight
Role, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., (Comm. Print. 1978),p. 44.

3/

In Re Alam, 180 N.Y.L.J., August 2, 1978, p. 6, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., August 1, 1978).
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B.

Objectives of the Section

The structure and functions of the Section are set
forth in its Organization Document,
a copy of which, as
amended and in effect at March 31, 1979 but excluding appen
dices, is attached as Exhibit I to this report.
Two key objectives of the Section are to (1) im
prove the quality of accounting and auditing practice by CPA
firms through the establishment of practice requirements for
member firms and (2) establish and maintain an effective
system of self-regulation of member firms by means of manda
tory triennial peer reviews of a firm's accounting and
auditing practice, required maintenance of an appropriate
system of quality control, and the imposition of sanctions
for failure to meet membership requirements.
C.

Structure of the Section

The Section is governed by an Executive Committee
with the assistance of a Peer Review Committee and such
other committees, subcommittees, and task forces as are con
sidered necessary. The Executive Committee is responsible
for (1) establishment of general policies and the oversight
of Section activities, (2) amendment of membership require
ments as necessary,
(3) determination of sanctions to be
imposed on member firms either on its own initiative or
based upon recommendations of the Peer Review Committee, and
(4) action to be taken upon complaints received with respect
to member firms.
A substantial majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are representatives of firms that audit
30 or more SEC clients. Representative Moss, SEC Chairman
Williams and spokesmen of some smaller firms have expressed
concern that the Section might be too heavily dominated by
representatives of the larger firms. The present provisions
of the Organization Document reflect some modifications in
composition, voting, and quorum requirements made in re
sponse to these concerns.4/ The Board, in exercising its
oversight responsibilities, will be mindful of the concern
that has been expressed in this regard.
The
Peer Review Committee is responsible for
(1) establishment of standards for performing and reporting

4/

See Organization Document, VI.2.(c). Membership on the
Executive Committee includes 16 individuals from firms
that audit 30 or more SEC clients and 5 individuals from
other firms.
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on peer reviews, (2) administration of the program of peer
reviews for member firms and the maintenance of appropriate
records of peer reviews, and (3) recommendations of sanc
tions and other disciplinary actions to the Executive Com
mittee.
D.

Membership Requirements

Each member firm is required to have a review at
least once every three years of the manner in which it con
ducts its accounting and auditing practice in order to
provide assurance that it has quality control policies and
procedures which are appropriate for its practice and which
comply with professional standards and with the Section’s
membership requirements. Other membership requirements re
late to the professional qualifications of the members of
the firm, continuing professional education, liability in
surance coverage, dues, and administrative matters.
The
Section also imposes on its members, with respect to SEC
clients, requirements related to audit partner rotation,
concurring reviews,
scope of management advisory services,
and reporting to audit committees or boards of directors.
II.

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

A stated objective of the Section is to "enhance
the effectiveness of the section's regulatory
system
through the monitoring and evaluation activities of an
independent oversight board composed of public members."
The responsibilities and functions of the Board, as
set forth in the Organization Document, are to:
(1) monitor
and evaluate the regulatory and sanction activities of the
Peer Review and Executive Committees of the Section; (2) de
termine that the Peer Review Committee is ascertaining that
firms are taking appropriate action as a result of peer re
views;
(3) conduct continuing oversight of all other activ
ities of the Section; (4) make recommendations to the Exec
utive Committee for improvements in the operations of the
Section; and (5) publish an annual report and such other
reports as may be deemed necessary with respect to its
activities. The Organization Document requires the Sec
tion's Executive Committee and Peer Review Committee to
consult from time to time with the Board, and members of the
Board have the right to attend meetings of those committees.
During its initial meetings, the Board considered
at length its oversight role contemplated by the Organiza
tion. Document, as contrasted to an arrangement in which it
would have authority to compel compliance with its views and
to overrule Executive Committee decisions contrary thereto.
The Board concluded that its oversight role should be pre
served and that it should not have line or appellate review
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authority. While there may be some advantages to being able
to exercise line authority, the Board concluded that its
ability to offer objective comment and criticism would be
greater if it were not a formal part of the structure for
planning and executing policy decisions of the Section. The
Board also concluded that its ability to comment publicly on
any matter regarding the accounting profession would provide
sufficient power to discharge the Board's responsibilities.
The SEC 1978 Report to Congress (p. 17) expressed concern
that the Board did not have line authority. However, the
report stated that the SEC was not prepared to conclude that
the lack of line authority would necessarily be fatal to the
Board's effectiveness.
The Board's experience thus far
indicates that line authority is not essential and that the
Section is indeed responsive to the Board's recommendations.
The Organization Document provides that the Board
shall consist of five members who "shall be drawn from among
prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation, in
cluding, but not limited to, former public officials,
law
yers, bankers,
securities industry executives, educators,
economists and business executives." Initial members of the
Board, who were appointed by the Executive Committee of the
Section with the approval of the Board of Directors of the
Institute, are John J. McCloy, Chairman, Ray Garrett, Jr.,
Vice Chairman, and William L. Cary, John D. Harper and
Arthur M. Wood. Mr. McCloy, The Assistant Secretary of War
from 1941 to 1945, the United States Military Governor and
High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952 and the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., from 1955 to 1960, is currently a member of the
New York City law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy;
Mr. Cary, Chairman of the SEC from 1961 to 1964, is the
Dwight Professor of Law at Columbia University; Mr. Garrett,
Chairman of the SEC from 1973 to 1975, is a member of the
Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton & Douglas; Mr. Harper is
the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief
Executive Officer of Aluminum Company of America; and Mr.
Wood is the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and
Chief Executive Officer of Sears, Roebuck and Co.
One of the first actions of the Board was to review
provisions of the Organization Document regarding its own
existence.
In order to provide a higher degree of indepen
dence from the Section and the Institute, the Board recom
mended a change in the Organization Document, which was
enacted by the Institute, to provide that
"Following its initial appointment, the Public
Oversight Board shall, in consultation with and
subject to the approval of the AICPA Board of
Directors, appoint, remove, and set the terms
and compensation of its members and select its
chairman."
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Thereafter, the Board adopted bylaws establishing staggered
three-year terms for its members, with the initial terms ex
piring on December 31, 1978 for Messrs. Cary and Garrett, on
December 31, 1979 for Messrs. Harper and Wood and on Decem
ber 31, 1980 for Mr. McCloy.
The Board's initial Chairman
was selected by the Executive Committee, but future Chairmen
are to be selected by the Board.
In May 1978, the Board
designated Mr. Garrett as Vice Chairman, and in December
1978,
Messrs.
Cary and Garrett were elected to new
three-year terms expiring on December 31, 1981. Annual com
pensation for Board members is*. Chairman, $50,000; Vice
Chairman, $40,000; and members, $30,000.
The Institute
indemnifies
Board members against losses and expenses
incurred by them in connection with litigation related to
their official activities.
Each member of the Board is
authorized to use assistance available in his office or law
firm in connection with the work of the Board. Mr. McCloy
has designated Richard A. Stark, a partner in the New York
City law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, as his
assistant and Mr. Garrett has designated Charles R. Manzoni,
Jr., a partner in the Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton &
Douglas, as his assistant. Mr. Stark serves as Secretary of
the Board and, prior to the employment of full-time staff,
performed general administrative tasks for the Board,
The
Board has employed a full-time Executive
Director and full-time Technical Director and plans to ob
tain additional staff as needed. Offices for the Board's
administrative staff have been established at 1270 Avenue of
the Americas, New York, New York 10020. Louis W. Matusiak,
formerly a partner of Alexander Grant &. Company, has been
Executive Director since May 1978. Saul Beldock, formerly a
partner of S. D. Leidesdorf & Co. and Ernst & Ernst, was a
consultant and later Technical Director until he resigned in
January 1979 for personal reasons. Stuart Newman, formerly
a manager with Touche Ross & Co., was appointed Technical
Director in February 1979. Messrs. Matusiak, Beldock and
Newman established procedures for monitoring peer reviews,
which the Board approved, and carried out the monitoring of
1978 peer reviews as discussed elsewhere in this annual
report (see pages 14-15).
Three recently retired partners of CPA firms (see
page 15), each of whom had extensive experience in his
former firm's quality control and internal inspection pro
gram, assisted the Board's staff in its monitoring of 1978
reviews.
It is contemplated that they and several other
recently retired partners will be employed on a part-time
basis to assist in the task of monitoring peer reviews in
future years.
During its first year of operation, the Board held
15 regular meetings and 3 telephone conference meetings.
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The Board also conducted public hearings in Chicago on
August 17 and 18, 1978, regarding the scope of services
issue discussed elsewhere in this report (see pages 16-21).
Representatives of the Board attended nearly all meetings of
the Executive Committee and Peer Review Committee of the
Section during the last year and met numerous times with
members of those committees and certain of the Commissioners
and staff of the SEC. Messrs. McCloy and Garrett offered
testimony to the Moss Subcommittee hearings on January 30,
1978 and four Board members offered additional testimony to
that subcommittee on July 28, 1978. Board members also par
ticipated directly in the Board's oversight of the peer re
view program by attending selected exit conferences between
the reviewers and top management of the reviewed firms.
III. PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
A.

Objectives

The centerpiece of the Institute's program for vol
untary self-regulation is the peer review program. As noted
above, each member firm of the Section is required to comply
with the Institute's professional standards and to have a
peer review at least once every three years of its quality
control policies and procedures as they relate to its
accounting and auditing practice. The objectives of a peer
review are to determine whether a reviewed firm's system of
quality control for its accounting and auditing practice is
appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed for the
firm, whether its quality control policies and procedures
are adequately documented and communicated to professional
personnel, and whether they are being complied with so as to
provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming
with professional standards and the membership requirements
of the Section.
Such determination is accomplished by
(1) study and evaluation of a reviewed firm's prescribed
quality control policies and procedures;
(2) testing for
compliance with such quality control policies and procedures
at each organizational or functional level within the firm
by inspection of selected engagement working paper files and
reports and other documents; and (3) testing for compliance
with other membership requirements of the Section.
B.

Peer Review Committee

The peer review program is administered by the Peer
Review Committee, which consists of 15 individuals appointed
from member firms by the Executive Committee. Almost all of
these Committee members are from large national firms.
The
Board is aware that concerns have been expressed about a
major representation from the larger firms and, in exercis
ing its oversight responsibilities, will be mindful of this
concern.
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The Peer Review Committee, under the leadership of
Donald L. Neebes, a partner of Ernst & Ernst, has, in less
than a year,
(a) established the basic framework for peer
reviews that involved numerous protracted meetings within
the profession and with the staff of the SEC and with the
Board and (b) produced a manual setting forth standards and
guidelines for performing and reporting on peer reviews and
establishing the administrative framework within which peer
reviews are to be conducted. The Board has been impressed
with the magnitude of the undertaking and the quality of the
initial effort.
In order to test the effectiveness of these
standards and guidelines, the Committee is studying the re
views that have been conducted to determine whether any re
visions should be made.
The Committee also presented a two-day orientation
session on peer reviews for member firms and reviewers.
Future training programs are to be part of the Institute’s
continuing education program.
C.

Selection of Reviewers

Under the program established by the Peer Review
Committee and approved by the Executive Committee, a peer
review may be conducted at the reviewed firm’s option by
another member firm selected by the reviewed firm or by a
team appointed by the Peer Review Committee. The Committee
is studying the possible use of review teams organized by
state societies of CPAs and by associations of CPA firms.
In the initially proposed program, in addition to
the review conducted either by members of a single firm or a
team drawn from several firms, performance review panels
were to be appointed by the Committee to determine whether
the reviewers were qualified to conduct the particular
review and whether the review was conducted in accordance
with established standards. Performance review panels were
to be appointed for firm-on-firm reviews and, on a test
basis, for Committee-appointed team reviews. The Board ex
pressed concern with the Committee’s decision that a firm
that opted for a firm-on-firm review was permitted to select
the reviewing firm. The staff of the SEC and others ex
pressed concern about the reliability of the firm-on-firm
reviews, especially since the firm can select its own re
viewer.
With regard to firm-on-firm reviews, the Board and
the SEC in its 1978 Report to Congress (p. 24) suggested
that, in order to overcome the concern expressed above, the
panel’s responsibility be expanded in a substantive way to
require an opinion as to the quality control system as it
relates to the accounting and auditing practice of the re
viewed firm. This suggestion was adopted by the Committee,
and the panel’s designation was changed from a performance
review panel to a quality control review panel.
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The Board is convinced that for medium and large
firms the option to use a single firm, rather than an ad hoc
team, is of great importance. There are several efficien
cies derived from using the resources of a single firm as
contrasted with the problems of assembling and coordinating
a team of persons who have not previously worked together.
Furthermore, while a firm can command the talents and exper
tise of its top specialists in the conduct of a peer review
it has undertaken,
such specialists may not be as readily
available for team-conducted reviews. The Board was also
impressed
with the argument that firm-on-firm reviews
provide the reviewed firm greater flexibility in negotiating
the fee.
Also, the addition of the quality control review
panel was intended to deal with whatever weakness might ap
pear to result from the reviewed firm's right of selection.
D.

Peer Review Reports and Letters of Comment

Upon completion of the review, the reviewing firm
or the review team, as the case may be, furnishes its report
to the reviewed firm. Further, a letter of comment on mat
ters that may require corrective action and suggestions for
improvement in its quality control system may be issued.
The reviewed firm has the responsibility to submit that
report, the letter of comments, if any, and its response
thereto, promptly to the Peer Review Committee. The report
of the quality control review panel is submitted directly to
the Peer Review Committee, which makes the report available
to both the reviewed and reviewing firms.
The Peer Review Committee examines each report,
letter of comments and the reviewed firm's response to
determine whether further action is required, including
whether it should recommend the imposition of sanctions to
the Executive Committee.
E . Content of Public Files
During the development of the peer review program,
the Peer Review Committee initially proposed, and the Execu
tive Committee concurred, that only the reviewer's report
be made public.
In discussions between the Board and mem
bers of the Peer Review and Executive Committees, the Board
expressed the view that there might be sufficient public in
terest in the letters of comment to warrant making them
public. A similar view was expressed in the SEC 1978 Report
to Congress (pp. 24-25).
The Committee reconsidered its
position and decided to make the comment letters and re
sponses thereto public.
In addition, several other documents are placed in
the public files:
(1) the firm's membership application,
which contains a profile of the firm's personnel and prac
tice; (2) the review panel's report, where required; (3) any
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sanctions imposed by the Executive Committee; and (4) noti
fication of discontinuance of review, if applicable.
F.

Confidentiality of Working Papers

The Board, as part of its oversight of the program,
has complete and unrestricted access to all phases of the
peer review process, including working papers of reviewers
and review panels. The Board, through its staff, has
ex
amined working papers for all 1978 peer reviews and will ex
amine working papers of future reviews on a selected basis.
In firm-on-firm reviews, the working papers remain the
property of the reviewing firm.
The working papers of
review teams and panels are placed in private files at the
Institute. Thus, none of the reviewers' working papers be
comes part of the Board's files. The Board's files consist
of (1) working papers developed by the Board's staff in the
performance of its own monitoring functions and (2) selected
items from the Institute's public files such as reports,
letters of comment, responses of the reviewed firms, and
certain information about the firms obtained from membership
records.
In order to maintain confidentiality of clientrelated information, the Board's working papers do not con
tain any information that could be used directly or indi
rectly to identify specific client engagements of the
reviewed firm or personnel associated with such engagements.
In the SEC 1978 Report to Congress (p. 23),
concern was expressed regarding whether the SEC would have
sufficient access to the peer review process to make an
objective evaluation of its adequacy.
All papers in the
files of the Board pertaining to 1978 peer reviews have been
made available to the staff of the SEC. Providing the SEC
access to other papers, particularly those containing spe
cific client data, could create complex legal and practical
problems for the Section and member firms and clients. The
staffs of the SEC and the Board are working to develop an
arrangement that will accommodate the legitimate concerns of
the profession and the needs of the SEC.
G.

Exclusion of Engagements from Scope of Review

Under procedures established by the Peer Review
Committee, a reviewed firm may exclude certain engagements
from the scope of a peer review, for example, when the fi
nancial statements are the subject of litigation or regu
latory investigation or when the client will not permit the
working papers to be reviewed. If a request is made to ex
clude a specific audit engagement from review, the reviewer
must evaluate and concur with the reasonableness of the
explanation for exclusion.
If an engagement is excluded,
alternative procedures are to be used by the reviewers, such
as review of other engagements in the same industry or a
similar area of practice and review of other work of super
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visory personnel who participated in the excluded engage
ment. If the exclusion materially limits the overall scope
of the review, the reviewers issue a modified report. This
standard,is in substantial agreement with the SEC 1978
Report to Congress (p. 25), which states that valid reasons
may exist for certain limitations, but expresses the view
that "the ultimate decision to exclude these engagements
should rest with the reviewers, under Board oversight, and
should depend on whether they are satisfied that the re
viewed firm’s personnel and the procedures utilized in those
engagements can be adequately examined in other ways."
In its monitoring activities, the Board inquired
whether there were any excluded engagements in the ten
reviews conducted in 1978. It ascertained that two firms
requested that a particular engagement be excluded; in one
case, a nonpublic client did not grant permission, and in
the second case, the client was under investigation by the
SEC. In both cases, the reviewers concluded that the exclu
sion did not materially affect the scope of review and
selected another engagement to obtain the desired coverage.
The Board intends to continue to monitor this aspect in
future peer reviews.
H.

Review of Audit Work Performed Outside of the
United States

As pointed out in the SEC 1978 Report to Congress
(pp. 25-26), subjecting audit work performed outside of the
United States to the review process involves complex prob
lems that will take time to resolve.
Professional bodies
and firms in the United States have significant limitations
on their authority to impose review requirements on account
ing firms in other countries.
Indeed such "intrusion" is
often resented and must be handled with care.
The Peer Review Committee is studying this matter.
Meetings have been held with representatives of the profes
sions in Canada, West Germany, France, The Netherlands and
the United Kingdom to describe the peer review program and
to ask for their cooperation in review of international
engagements. The current discussions are limited in scope,
pertaining only to the quality of accounting and auditing
work, including independence considerations, as it relates
to financial statements used in connection with the offer or
sale of securities in the United States. The various organ
izations agreed to consider the matter and reconvene in
June. The Board is monitoring the Committee's progress and
will consider its conclusions before addressing this issue.
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I.

Peer Review Schedule

The Peer Review Committee reports that as of
March 31, 1979, 550 firms were members of the Section, 355
of which had tentatively selected their review year as fol
lows:
Number of Firms

Year of Review
1978 (completed)
1979
1980
Undecided

10
110

235
195
550

Of the firms that have selected their review year, 136, or
38 percent, will have firm-on-firm reviews.
Because member firms vary widely in size and in the
nature of their practice, it is helpful to evaluate the
schedule of peer reviews in terms of its coverage of SEC
clients. The following schedule, based on data derived from
"Who Audits America"5/ has been furnished by the Peer Review
Committee:
Year of Review
1978
1979
1980
Undecided

Number
of SEC Clients

Percent

2,210
1,820
3,010
155

31%
25
42
2

7,195

100%

Of the 3,010 SEC clients whose auditors will be covered by
peer reviews in 1980, 2,300 are clients of firms that were
reviewed in 1977, prior to the establishment of the Section.
Thus, member firms that audit 63 percent of SEC clients were
reviewed during 1977 and 1978 and member firms that audit 88
percent will be reviewed by the end of 1979.
The Peer Review Committee reports that approxi
mately 99% of the U.S. companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and more than 93% of the U.S. companies

5/

2nd edition (Menlo Park, California:
Press, May 1978).
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Data Financial

listed on the American Stock Exchange are audited by members
of the Section.6/ The Board is informed that the Section
intends to make every effort to include in its membership
all firms that audit SEC clients. Letters have been sent to
all CPA
firms that are not members of the Section and are
believed to have one or more SEC clients.
It is expected
that as the Section becomes more established more firms will
join.
Although the vast number of CPA firms that serve as
auditors of companies whose securities are listed on the
major stock exchanges are members of the Section, a large
number of firms that practice before the SEC are not. While
only 550 CPA firms are members of the Section, the staff of
the SEC reports that there are approximately 1,200 CPA firms
that audit the 9,700 companies required to file financial
statements with the SEC under various sections of the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of
6/

Information on extent of coverage of listed companies
by members of the Section:
NYSE

ASE

Listed companies whose auditors
are members of the Section

1,509

880

Listed companies whose auditors
are not members of the Section

11

64

1,520

944

30

64

1

8

1,551

1,016

Listed foreign companies
Other*
Total number of listed companies**

One company listed on the American Stock Exchange
is shown by Moody's as not having an auditor; in
other cases, no record of the company can be
located in reference sources currently available.
* *

Based on "mid-1977" listing supplied by the New
York Stock Exchange and February 28, 1979 list
ing supplied by the American Stock Exchange.
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1934.
Some of the difference is accounted for by the vari
ations in the definitions of an "SEC client" used in accumu
lating these data.
Whatever the correct number of nonmember firms
may be, the Board shares the profession’s and the SEC's con
cern about firms that audit publicly held companies that are
not members of the Section.
J.

1978 Peer Reviews

Peer reviews of ten firms, which among them audit
over 2,200 SEC clients, were conducted in 1978. Six reviews
were conducted by committee-appointed review teams and four
were conducted by individual firms; three firm-on-firm re
views were reviews of "Big Eight" firms and the other a re
view of a single-office, three-partner firm with no SEC
clients.
Unqualified reports were issued in nine of the ten
reviews. The qualified report resulted not from a deficien
cy in the firm's quality control system but from a failure
by the reviewed firm to comply with the Section's membership
requirement relating to liability insurance coverage; the
firm subsequently obtained the required amount of insurance
coverage.
The Board's staff questioned the appropriateness of
the application of reporting standards to one review and re
quested the Peer Review Committee to investigate. The Com
mittee had not concluded its consideration of this matter as
of the date of this report. In addition, the Board’s over
sight program includes monitoring reviews commenced but dis
continued prior to completion. Two such cases occurred in
1978 and the Peer Review Committee is reviewing both cases
to ascertain whether the discontinuances were justified.
K.

The Board's Monitoring of the Peer Review Program

In order to ascertain whether the Section's quality
control compliance reviews are conducted and reported upon
according to the "Standards for Performing and Reporting on
Quality Control Compliance Reviews" as promulgated in the
manual published by the Peer Review Committee, and whether
the reports and letters of comments are consistent with the
findings of the reviewers, the Board instructed its staff to
prepare and implement an appropriate monitoring program.
The Board's oversight and monitoring program consists of
(1) postreview of working papers prepared by reviewers, in
cluding panels,
(2) observation of reviews in process with
emphasis on attendance at exit conferences, and (3) other
selected procedures. The selection of specific peer reviews
and the number of each type of review to be covered in the
Board's monitoring program are determined from time to time
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by the Board. The Board will make such comments regarding
the peer review program as it finds appropriate to the Exec
utive Committee and Peer Review Committee and to such others
as it deems advisable.
The objectives of the Board’s program are to deter
mine whether peer review standards have been adhered to with
respect to the scope and conduct of review, excluded engage
ments, documentation of work performed, report and letter of
comments issued.
The Board’s program relating to firm-onfirm reviews selected for monitoring and the attendant qual
ity control review panels includes a review of all working
papers prepared by the panels and preselected portions of
the working papers prepared by the reviewing firms; addi
tional portions are selected for review if results obtained
from the preselected portions are inconclusive. The scope
of the Board’s monitoring of a committee-appointed team
review is identical to that of a firm-on-firm review.
For selected reviews, visits are made by Board per
sonnel to certain offices of the reviewed firm while the
review is in process. These visits are generally made by
Board staff representatives, except that one or more Board
members attend selected exit conferences.
In addition, in
terviews are held with, or questionnaires are sent to,
reviewers regarding the conduct of review; interviews are
held with, or questionnaires are sent to, top management of
reviewed firms regarding the conduct of and results obtained
from the engagement; and reviewers’ qualifications are
tested.
It is expected that most quality control system
reviews will be conducted in the summer and fall months. To
assist the full-time staff in monitoring these reviews on a
timely basis, a cadre of qualified monitors will be employed
on a part-time basis. The cadre will consist solely of re
tired partners of CPA firms who have had extensive experi
ence in at least one of the following areas:
(a) quality
control system design and operation, (b) internal inspection
program,
(c) independent preissuance review, or (d) engage
ment partner on SEC audit clients. Generally, only partners
who have retired within the prior three-year period will be
employed.
The Board successfully tested this concept in its
monitoring of the 1978 reviews by using the services of John
W. Nicholson (formerly of Arthur Young & Company), R. Kirk
Batzer (formerly of Coopers & Lybrand) and Harry F. Reiss,
Jr. (formerly of Ernst & Ernst). Each one served as the
Board’s representative in monitoring one of the larger firm
reviews; in each case, the Board representative was not for
merly associated with either the reviewing firm or the
reviewed firm. Their extensive experience provided the ad
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ditional benefit of suggestions for
refinement of the Board's program.

modifications

to

and

Based on its oversight of the 1978 reviews, the
Board suggested to the Peer Review Committee several im
provements in the peer review process, certain of which have
been adopted.
L . The Board's Conclusions on the Peer Review Program
Based on its experience with the program to date,
the Board concludes that the standards and procedures for
conducting, reporting on and administering the peer review
program are satisfactory and that the program is being im
plemented in a professional manner.
The Board believes that the ultimate objectives of
the program -- to improve financial reporting and the qual
ity of audits of financial statements -- are being achieved.
Even though it may be assumed that the majority of member
firms have acceptable quality control systems or will have
by the time they are reviewed, the Board believes improve
ments are likely to be effected as a result of the peer
review process, both for the reviewed firms and
the
reviewers' firms.
The Board's observations of the 1978 reviews indi
cate that the dual reporting plan for firm-on-firm reviews
is working satisfactorily. However, after some experience
has been gained, the Board may seek a reconsideration of
this plan in the hope that the duplicative aspects can be
reduced or eliminated.
IV.

SCOPE OF SERVICES BY CPA FIRMS

A major study undertaken by the Board in 1978
focused on the "scope of services" issue. A basic question
was raised as to whether a certified public accountant who
provides management advisory services ("MAS") for an audit
client impairs his ability to render an independent opinion
on the fairness of that client's financial statements or im
pairs his professional image. Over the years, the profes
sion, Congressional committees and other critics and commen
tators have studied the issue and offered varying opinions
and advice. The SEC also expressed interest in the subject
and in September 1977 solicited public comment on several
questions relating to scope of services in Securities Act
Release No. 5869 (September 26, 1977). The SEC, however,
refrained from taking any action, beyond requiring certain
disclosures in proxy material, to deal with the subject un
til the Board's views were added to the deliberative
process.
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The Board undertook the study of the scope of serv
ices issue in May 1978, pursuant to a request by the Execu
tive Committee that the Board consider the proposal of that
Committee to amend portions of the
Organization Document
relating to the permissible scope of MAS for members of the
Section. The proposed amendments were tentatively approved
by the Executive Committee on May 8, 1978, subject to ob
taining the Board’s views.
The scope of services criteria initially embodied
in the Organization Document provided that members of the
Section should refrain from providing MAS to audit clients
that are SEC reporting companies if providing such services
would impair their independence or if such services are pre
dominantly commercial in character, inconsistent with the
firm's professional status as certified public accountants,
or inconsistent with the firm's responsibilities to the pub
lic.
The Organization Document also stated that, in deter
mining which MAS to perform, such services should be predom
inantly in "accounting and financial related areas." Psy
chological testing, conducting public opinion polls, and
merger and acquisition work for a finder's fee were ex
pressly prohibited. Marketing consulting, plant layout, and
executive search were also specifically addressed.
The Executive Committee's May 8 proposal took a
slightly different tack. As proposed, the membership re
quirement relating to scope of MAS would prohibit members of
the Section from furnishing certain services to an SEC
client when such services (1) impair the firm's independence
in expressing an opinion on financial statements of that
client or (2) require skills not related to accounting or
auditing. The proposal also contained a discussion of the
application of those two criteria to executive recruitment,
marketing consulting, plant layout and design, product de
sign and analysis, insurance actuarial services, and em
ployee benefit consulting, indicating which types of ser
vices within those broad categories would and would not
satisfy the criteria. Although the Executive Committee had
previously asked the Board's views of the proposal, on May
26, 1978, it adopted that portion of the proposal proscrib
ing executive recruiting services.
Because of the importance of this issue and the
varied, sometimes conflicting,
interests of persons most
concerned, the Board resolved to solicit written comments
and to hold public hearings on the subject.
Written com
ments were received from 152 individuals and firms, and 31
persons testified at the hearings held in Chicago,
Illinois
on August 17 and 18, 1978.
In addition to developing its own record, the Board
drew from the several studies, articles, and surveys that
have focused on the scope of services issue over the last
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fifteen years and from the more than 400 written public com
ments on the subject received by the SEC pursuant to Securi
ties Act Release No. 5869. With that background material
and after months of consideration and deliberation, in March
1979, the Board published its report on Scope of Services by
CPA firms ("MAS Report").
The Board's conclusions and recommendations to the
Executive Committee in the MAS Report under the caption
"Conclusions and Recommendations" are set forth below:
The conclusions and recommendations contained in
this section of the report reflect the Board's views
with respect to the specific scope of service limita
tions which are presently a condition of membership in
the SEC Practice Section and those scope of service lim
itations which are embodied in the Proposal. While the
Board's general conclusions and recommendations might be
viewed in some respects as more permissive than the ex
isting and proposed scope of service limitations, this
should not suggest that the Board perceives no problems
associated with accounting firms furnishing all forms of
MAS to audit clients. The most fundamental departure by
the Board from the existing and proposed scope of ser
vice limitations appears in the Board's treatment of
those forms of MAS which do not impair auditor indepen
dence but which involve services not in accounting or
financial related areas or which do not require skills
related to accounting or auditing--that is, services
which may impair the professional image of an accountant
but not his independence.
As discussed more fully in the body of this report,
the Board is concerned with professional image but does
not believe that rule-making is the appropriate way to
address the problem. Rather, the Board believes it is
preferable to rely on public disclosure, supplemented by
the admonition to members of the SEC Practice Section to
exercise self-restraint and judgment before venturing
into new areas of MAS.
With this in mind, the Board has drawn the follow
ing conclusions and makes the following recommendations:
1.
There are many potential benefits to be
realized by permitting auditors to perform MAS for
audit clients which should not be denied to such
clients without a strong showing of actual or po
tential
detriment.
The profession, therefore,
should be careful not to impose unnecessarily broad
prophylactic rules with respect to MAS and indepen
dence.
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2.
The Board generally concludes that manda
tory limitations on scope of services should be
predicated only on the determination that certain
services, or the role of the firm performing cer
tain services, will impair a member's independence
in rendering an opinion on the fairness of a
client's financial statements or present a strong
likelihood of doing so. Independence is generally
defined as the ability to operate with integrity
and objectivity.
Integrity is an element of char
acter, and objectivity relates to the ability of an
auditor to maintain impartiality of attitude and
avoid conflicts of interest. All conflicts of in
terest are not avoidable and some conflicts of in
terest produce countervailing benefits. Such con
flicts are accepted, consistent with the concept of
independence, because of practical necessity and
the realization of important benefits, coupled with
the fact that auditor integrity and various legal
incentives provide adequate public
protection.
This helps explain public acceptance of the fact
that auditors can be "independent" even though the
client selects them and pays their fee. It also
helps explain why there has been public acceptance
of accounting firms furnishing a variety of tax ad
visory services to audit clients.
Recognizing,
therefore, that independence in an absolute sense
cannot be achieved, when evaluating whether certain
services should be prohibited, it is necessary to
consider the potential benefits derived from the
service and balance them against the possible or
apparent impairment to the auditor's objectivity.
3.
At this time no rules should be imposed
to prohibit specific services on the grounds that
they are or may be incompatible with the profession
of public accounting, might impair the image of the
profession, or do not involve accounting or audit
ing related skills.
4.
The existing limitations on MAS concern
ing independence contained in the Professional
Standards relating to Management Advisory Services
("MAS Professional Standards"), AICPA, Professional
Standards, Vol. 1, MS §§ 101 et seq. and the Code
of Professional Ethics, AICPA, Professional Stan
dards, Vol. 2, ET §§ 50 et seq. [footnote omitted]
embrace several provisions that are helpful in
ensuring that independence will be maintained.
Compliance with those applicable provisions should
be made a condition of membership in the SEC Prac
tice Section and peer reviews should be required to
test for compliance.
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5.
Amendments to Regulation 14A (the proxy
rules) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
certain publicly available reports required of mem
bers of the SEC Practice Section will increase the
amount of public disclosure concerning the nature
and amount of MAS furnished by an auditor to an au
dit client and will reveal whether the client's au
dit committee or board of directors have both ap
proved the MAS and considered its possible effect
on independence. To the extent that certain MAS
may be perceived publicly as impairing indepen
dence, the new disclosure rules, including the role
of the audit committee or the board of directors,
should either allay suspicion or cause clients and
auditors to alter their relationships. These dis
closure provisions should be given a chance to
work, and they should serve to provide a stronger
data base for monitoring of this area.
The Board does, however, recommend that SEC
Practice Section members be required to include in
their annual disclosure statements filed with the
SEC Practice Section disclosure of gross fees both
for MAS and tax services performed for audit
clients expressed as a percentage of aggregate fees
charged during the reporting period.
6.
In the Board's view an accounting firm's
independence is not impaired solely because a per
son associated with the firm acts as an enrolled
actuary for an employee benefit plan of an audit
client or as an enrolled actuary for such a plan
which is an audit client.
The Board, however,
believes that an accounting firm should not provide
actuarial services for an insurance company audit
client unless those services are supplemental to
primary actuarial advice furnished by another actu
ary not associated with the accounting firm.
7.
The Board accepts the recent action of
the Executive Committee proscribing certain execu
tive recruiting services inasmuch as the services
proscribed are perceived by others as having a
strong likelihood of impairing independence, are
available from other responsible sources, and do
not otherwise produce sufficient countervailing
benefits.
In general, however, the Board is reluc
tant to support prohibitions against useful serv
ices which are based primarily on
appearance
without an adequate basis in fact.
Thus, in general, the Board rejected that aspect of
the Executive Committee's proposal, as well as the then ex
isting scope of services limitation, which attempted to pro
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scribe services that may be incompatible with the profession
of accounting or the image of the accounting profession
without also impairing independence. Rather, as a general
principle, the Board recommended that maintenance of inde
pendence be the sole limiting criterion.
While the Board accepted the Executive Committee's
decision to proscribe certain executive recruiting services
and recommended that limitations be placed on members of the
Section in performing primary or exclusive actuarial serv
ices that have an effect on the financial statements of in
surance company audit clients, it counselled the profession
not to undertake any other effort at this time to identify
specific services which should be proscribed.
Rather, the
MAS Report notes that other less draconian measures or pro
cedures should be employed before resorting to outright pro
scription.
These other measures are the new disclosures in
proxy statements7/ and in reports filed by members of the
Section and the recent encouragement of audit committees and
boards of directors to be aware of the existence of MAS en
gagements, to approve them, and in so doing, consider the
matter of independence.
In addition, the Board recommends
that the scope of the Section's mandatory peer review be
revised to require a review of MAS engagements performed for
audit clients to test for compliance with the independence
standards.
The Board believes that these new measures should
serve to allay public suspicion, to the extent it exists,
and will furnish a data base for further monitoring in this
area.
In its MAS Report, the Board cautioned the Execu
tive Committee that its "conclusions should not be inter
preted to mean that the Board views the matter of scope of
services with complacency or believes that possible dangers
can be avoided solely with general exhortations to members
to preserve independence." While it does not believe that
rule-making is the appropriate way to address the problem,
the report states "the Board believes it is preferable to
rely on public disclosure, supplemented by the admonition to
members of the SEC Practice Section to exercise selfrestraint and judgment before venturing into new areas of
MAS."
V.

PROCEDURES FOR ALLEGED OR POSSIBLE AUDIT FAILURES

One of the first matters identified by the Execu
tive Committee for consultation with the Board relates to

7/

Accounting Series Release No. 250 (June 29, 1978).
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the investigative and disciplinary action that should be
taken by the Section with respect to an alleged or possible
audit failure involving a member firm.
The Organization Document provides that the Execu
tive Committee shall have the authority to impose sanctions
on member firms either on its own initiative or on the basis
of recommendations of the Peer Review Committee and shall
establish procedures designed to ensure due process to firms
in connection with disciplinary proceedings. Sanctions con
templated in the Organization Document include (a) required
corrective measures by the firm, (b) additional requirements
for continuing professional education, (c) accelerated or
special peer reviews, (d) admonishments, censures, repri
mands,
(e) monetary fines, (f) suspension of membership and
(g) expulsion from membership. Under these provisions, upon
the occurrence of an alleged or possible audit failure,
which might raise a question concerning the quality controls
of the member firm involved, the Section could accelerate
the commencement of a regular triennial peer review or order
a special peer review. The purpose of such a peer review
would be to determine whether the member firm is maintaining
and applying quality controls in accordance with standards
established by the Section. Under the existing structure
such reviews would not deal with the specific case involving
an alleged audit failure, but could examine the quality con
trols of the member firm and of the office of the firm
(including the individuals) involved in the alleged audit
failure.
It should be noted that individual CPAs who are
members of the Institute are subject to disciplinary action
by the AICPA Ethics Committee ("Ethics Committee"). Pro
ceedings of the Ethics Committee are generally deferred dur
ing the pendency of litigation, a fact that was noted and
criticized by the Cohen Commisson.8/ Since an alleged audit
failure will often cause civil litigation to be commenced or
threatened, as well as investigation and threatened enforce
ment action by the SEC or other government agencies, the
question is presented whether the Section should adopt the
deferral policy of the Ethics Committee in such circum
stances.
Before addressing the basic policy issues, the
Board received from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy a com
prehensive memorandum dated September 11, 1978 entitled
"Disciplinary Procedures for Audit Failures: an Analysis of
Legal Issues." The purpose of the memorandum was to pro-

8/

The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report,
Conclusions, and Recommendations (1978), pp. 149-150.
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vide background information to the Board regarding legal is
sues raised by a private self-disciplinary system for member
firms in the event of an alleged or possible audit failure.
The memorandum reviewed reports of Congressional committees,
the SEC, the Cohen Commission and other interested commenta
tors, and described the disciplinary structures already in
place.
The memorandum analyzed the potential prejudice to
member firms which may result from conducting disciplinary
proceedings prior to the conclusion of any civil or criminal
actions and discussed the question of whether the simultan
eous conduct of disciplinary proceedings raises constitu
tional problems.
It further discussed issues relating to
the effectiveness of a disciplinary system which, absent
legislation, would have to rely on the contractual consent
of member firms to provide testimony and documents in the
event of disciplinary proceedings. Requirements that disci
plinary procedures provide due process safeguards for member
firms also were considered. The memorandum also mentioned
certain antitrust implications of disciplinary procedures.
The memorandum concluded generally that there are
no insurmountable legal impediments to the conduct of disci
plinary proceedings while litigation is pending or threat
ened, but that any such proceedings must provide minimum due
process protections and in certain cases there may be prac
tical limitations on the ability of such proceedings to ob
tain necessary evidence.
The Board also received from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
& McCloy a memorandum dated November 10, 1978 and revised
December 29, 1978 entitled "Disciplinary Proceedings for
Audit Failures: Areas for Discussion" which sought to iden
tify some of the broad policy issues and other considera
tions involved in the disciplinary procedure question.
In
addition, at the Board's request, Willkie Farr & Gallagher,
legal counsel for the Institute, furnished the Board a memo
randum dated December 1, 1978, entitled "Deferral of Disci
plinary Proceedings" which discussed various legal consider
ations involved in the Institute's policy of deferring dis
ciplinary actions against individual members during the pen
dency of civil, criminal or administrative proceedings aris
ing out of the matter which is the subject of the disciplin
ary proceeding.
After extended study of the matter, including the
memoranda mentioned above and discussions with the Executive
Committee, the Board concluded that the protection of users
of audited financial statements should be the dominant con
sideration in any response by the Section to information
suggesting the possibility of an audit failure.
Some ap
parent audit failures may raise a question with respect to
auditing standards and procedures. This was the case, for
example, when the difficulties of Equity Funding Corporation
first became generally known and the press suggested that it
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involved a great "computer fraud" accomplished by electronic
devices that defied the auditors' procedures. These sugges
tions turned out to be wrong, but, should a case giving rise
to such suggestions occur in the future, the Section should
be prepared to begin a prompt inquiry and to recommend
appropriate changes.
The more usual type of alleged or possible audit
failure could raise questions concerning the quality con
trols of the member firm, or perhaps the firm's office re
sponsible for the audit. In such cases the Board has recom
mended that the Section be prepared to take measures, in
cluding special peer reviews, to assure itself and others
that there is no likelihood of future harm from the auditing
work of that firm or office.
Formal disciplinary proceedings directed toward the
punishment of the member firm are of less immediate impor
tance.
One purpose of disciplinary action, to be sure, is
the deterrent effect on the firm that is punished and its
example to others. Nevertheless, where the Section satis
fies itself that an alleged or possible audit failure does
not indicate any significant danger of avoidable future
failures, or, if it does, that corrective measures have been
taken, the Board believes that the Section will not be dere
lict if it postpones formal disciplinary proceedings in def
erence to considerations of fairness and due process arising
from the pendency of civil or criminal litigation or govern
ment action, or in the end foregoes such proceedings on the
ground that the member firm has suffered enough and that
punishment resulting from the other actions has accomplished
all of the prophylactic benefit that can be expected.
How
ever, the Section should have the authority to institute
formal disciplinary proceedings in those circumstances where
such action is deemed appropriate notwithstanding the pen
dency of litigation or government action.
To that end, the Board has recommended to the Sec
tion that a permanent committee be established to monitor,
and to determine what action if any should be taken with
respect to, alleged or possible audit failures involving
member firms. At its March 27, 1979 meeting, the Executive
Committee agreed in general with the concepts expressed by
the Board and appointed a task force to develop recommenda
tions for implementation.
VI

CONCLUSIONS

During its first year the Board has participated
in the development of the Section, which is a new mechanism
within the accounting profession for self-regulation and
self-discipline of CPA firms engaged in auditing
SEC
clients.
Members of the Section have committed themselves
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to burdensome and costly mandatory peer reviews, and the
Section is dealing with other major issues, including the
scope of services issue and the question of the Section's
role with respect to alleged or possible audit failures.
The Institute deserves much credit for its aggres
sive development of the Section and its programs.
It is
also important to acknowledge the substantial contribution
of the SEC through constructive criticism provided by Chair
man Williams and other Commissioners and by A. Clarence
Sampson, Chief Accountant, and members of his staff in many
meetings and telephone conferences.
It is too early to
state that all concerns of the SEC have been or can be dealt
with to its satisfaction. Nevertheless, the close coordi
nation and exchange of views between the Section and the SEC
have been important ingredients in moving forward to date.
The Board believes that, due to the substantial
progress to date, the strong commitment of the profession
and the encouragement and support of the SEC, the Section's
program for self-regulation will be effective.
Moreover,
the Board believes that, as a matter of principle, self
regulation is preferable to additional governmental regula
tion and that every effort should be made to ensure the suc
cess of the Section's program.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

March 31, 1979
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EXHIBIT I

Organization Document as Amended Through
March 31, 1979 (Excluding Appendices A and B
Relating to Management Advisory Services)
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Organizational Structure and
Functions of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA Division for
CPA Firms
I.

Source of Authority
The section was established by a resolution of the Council of
the AICPA adopted on September 17, 1977.

II.

III.

Name
The name of the section shall be the “SEC Practice Section”
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
Objectives
The objectives of the section shall be to achieve the following:
1. Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms before the
Securities and Exchange Commission through the estab
lishment of practice requirements for member firms.
2. Establish and maintain an effective system of self-regula
tion of member firms by means of mandatory peer reviews,
required maintenance of appropriate quality controls,
and the imposition of sanctions for failure to meet
membership requirements.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of the section’s regulatory system
through the monitoring and evaluation activities of an
independent oversight board composed of public mem
bers.
4. Provide a forum for development of technical information
relating to SEC practice.

IV.

Membership
1.

E lig ib ility a n d A d m issio n of M e m b e rs

All CPA firms are eligible for membership in the section
even though they do not practice before the SEC. Mem
bership in the section shall not constitute membership in
the AICPA nor entitle any member firm to any of the
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rights or privileges of membership in the AICPA. To
become a member, a firm must submit to the section a
written application agreeing to abide by all of the re
quirements for membership. The application must be
accompanied by firm information for the most recent full
fiscal year as described under 3 (g) of this section.
The membership of the section shall consist of all
firms which meet with the admission requirements and
continue to maintain their membership in good standing.
2.

T e rm in a tio n an d R e in sta te m e n t of M e m b e rs
(a)

(b)

5.

Membership of a CPA firm may be terminated—
(1) By submission of a resignation, provided the
firm is not the subject of a pending investiga
tion or recommendation of the peer review
committee for sanctions or other disciplinary
action by the executive committee or under
review by the public oversight board.
(2) By action of the executive committee for
failure to adhere to the requirements of mem
bership.
Membership of a terminated CPA firm may be
reinstated—
(1) By complying with the admission requirements
for new members if termination occurred by
resignation.
(2) By complying with the admission requirements
for new members and obtaining the approval of
the executive committee if termination was
imposed as a sanction.

R e q u irem en ts of M e m b e rs

Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the following:
(a ) Ensure that a majority of members of the firm are
CPAs, that the firm can legally engage in the practice
of public accounting, and that each proprietor,
shareholder, or partner of the firm resident in the
United States and eligible for AICPA membership
is a member of the AICPA.
(b) Adhere to quality control standards established by
the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee.
(c) Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s accounting and
audit practice every three years or at such additional
times as designated by the executive committee, the
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reviews to be conducted in accordance with review
standards established by the section’s peer review
committee.
(d)

Ensure that all professionals in the firm resident in
the United States, including CPAs and non-CPAs,
participate in at least one hundred twenty hours
of continuing professional education over three
years, but in not less than twenty hours in any given
year.

(e)

Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each
SEC engagement which has had another audit part
ner-in-charge for a period of five consecutive years
and prohibit such incumbent partner from return
ing to in-charge status on the engagement for a
minimum of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirement shall not become effective
until two years after a firm becomes a member.
(2) In unusual circumstances, the chief executive
partner of a firm or his designee may grant no
more than one two-year extension so long as
there is an in-depth supplemental review by
another partner, or
(3) An application for relief is granted by the
peer review committee on the basis of unusual
hardships.

(f)

Ensure that a concurring review of the audit report
by a partner other than the audit partner in charge
of an SEC engagement is required before issuance
of an audit report on the financial statements of an
SEC registrant. The peer review committee may
authorize alternative procedures where this require
ment cannot be met because of the size of the mem
ber firm.

(g)

File with the section for each fiscal year of the United
States firm (covering offices maintained in the
United States and its territories) the following in
formation to be open to public inspection:
(1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership or
corporation) and identification of domestic
affiliates rendering services to clients.
(2) Description or chart of internal organizational
structure and international organization (in-
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(h )

(i)

cluding the nature of relationships main
tained in each geographic region).
(3) Number and location of offices.
(4) Total number of partners and non-CPAs with
parallel status within the firm’s organizational
structure.
(5) Total number of CPAs (including partners).
(6) Total number of professional staff (including
partners).
(7) Total number of personnel (including item
6, above).
(8) Number and names of SEC clients for which
the firm is principal auditor-of-record and any
changes of such clients.
(9) Number of SEC audit clients each of whose
total domestic fees exceed 5 percent of total
domestic firm fees and the percentage which
each of these clients’ fees represent to total
domestic firm fees.
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has com
plied with AICPA and SEC independence re
quirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation as re
quired under generally accepted accounting
principles and indicating whether such pend
ing litigation is expected to have a material
effect on the firm’s financial condition or its
ability to serve clients.
(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, tax,
and MAS expressed as a percentage of total
gross fees.
Maintain such minimum amounts and types of
accountants’ liability insurance as shall be prescribed
from time to time by the executive committee.
When determining its scope of management advisory
services, place primary emphasis on accounting and
financial related areas* and refrain from performing

* These areas would include the design and installation of systems (such as
computer-based systems and procedures) and the performance of studies related
to the accounting, general record-keeping, and control. This process relates to
recording, compiling, analyzing, and communicating financial and economic
information, expressed in money or other quantities. This process involves and
provides support to the essential organizational functions, such as (1) sales and
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management advisory services engagements for audit
clients whose securities are registered with the SEC
that—
(1) Would create a loss of the firm’s independence
for the purpose of expressing opinions on
financial statements of such clients.
(2) Are predominantly commercial in character
and inconsistent with the firm’s professional
status as certified public accountants.
(3) Are inconsistent with the firm’s responsibilities
to the public.
(4) Consist of the following types of services:
(i) Psychological testing
(ii) Public opinion polls
(iii) Merger and acquisition assistance for a
finder’s fee
(5) Will be proscribed by the executive committee
after further study and which comprise portions
of what is included under the broad classifica
tions of marketing consulting and plant layout
as tentatively outlined in Appendix A.
(6) May be proscribed by the executive committee
from time to time after further study based on
the concepts described above and in Appendix
A. (See resolution of executive committee,
Appendix B.)
Report
annually to the audit committee or board of
(j)
directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of each
SEC audit client on the total fees received from the
client for management advisory services during the
year under audit and a description of the types of
such services rendered.
(k) Report to the audit committee or board of directors
(or its equivalent in a partnership) of each SEC
audit client on the nature of disagreements with the
management of the client on financial accounting

distribution of products or services; (2) protection and custody of assets; (3)
procurement and use of raw materials, capital, and human resources; and (4)
production of products or services. These complex functions are closely inter
related in an integrated system. The specific elements of the overall system
interact with each other in many ways and at many levels of the organization.
The process also embraces systems for planning and budgeting, including
comparisons between planned results and actual results.

33

(l)

V.

and reporting matters and auditing procedures
which, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have
caused the issuance of a qualified opinion on the
client’s financial statements.
Pay dues as established by the executive committee
and comply with the rules and regulations of the
section as established from time to time by the
executive committee and with the decisions of the
executive committee in respect of matters within its
competence; cooperate with the peer review com
mittee in connection with its duties, including dis
ciplinary proceedings; and comply with any sanction
which may be imposed by the executive committee.

Governing Bodies
The activities of the section shall be governed by an execu
tive committee having senior status within the AICPA with
authority to carry out the activities of the section. Such
activities shall not conflict with the policies and standards
of the AICPA.
All activities of the section shall be subject to the over
sight and public reporting thereon by a public oversight
board.

VI.

Executive Committee
1.

C o m p o sitio n an d T e rm s
(a)
(b)

(c)

2.

The executive committee shall be composed of
representatives of at least twenty-one member firms.
The terms of executive committee members shall
be for three years, with initial staggered terms to
provide for seven expirations each year.
Executive committee members shall continue in
office until their successors have been appointed.

A p p o in tm e n t

The members of the executive committee shall be
appointed by the AICPA chairman with the ap
proval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(b) All appointments after the initial executive commit
tee is established shall also require approval of the
then existing executive committee.

(a )
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(c)

3.

Nominations for appointments of representatives of
member firms to the executive committee shall be
provided to the chairman of the AICPA by a
nominating committee of the section. The section’s
nominating committee shall be elected by the
AICPA Council and consist of individuals drawn
from seven of the member firms of the section. It
is intended that nominations shall adhere to the
principle that the executive committee shall at all
times include representatives of all member firms
which audit the financial statements of thirty or
more registrants under section 12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 and at least five represen
tatives of firms which audit financial statements of
fewer than thirty such registrants plus one addi
tional such representative for each representative, in
excess of sixteen, of firms which audit thirty or more
registrants.

E le c tio n of C h a irm a n

The chairman of the executive committee shall be elected
from among its members to serve at the pleasure of the
executive committee but in no event for more than three
one-year terms.
4.

R e s p o n sib ilitie s a n d F u n ctio n s

The executive committee shall—
(a) Establish general policies for the section and over
see its activities.
( b ) Amend requirements for membership as necessary,
but in no event shall such requirements be designed
so as to unreasonably preclude membership by any
CPA firm.
(c) Establish budgets and dues requirements to fund
activities of the section not provided for in the
AICPA general budget. Such dues shall be scaled
in proportion to the size of member firms.
(d) Determine sanctions to be imposed on member
firms based upon recommendations of the peer re
view committee of the section.
(e) Receive, evaluate, and act upon other complaints
received with respect to actions of member firms.
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(f)

Establish the initial public oversight board with the
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(g) Appoint persons to serve on such committees and
task forces as necessary to carry out its functions.
( h ) Make recommendations to other AICPA boards and
committees for their consideration.
(i)
Consult from time to time with the public oversight
board.
5.

Q u o r u m , V o tin g , M e e tin g s , a n d A tte n d a n c e

A majority of the members of the executive com
mittee or their designated alternates must be present
to constitute a quorum.
( b ) Affirmative votes of a majority of the members of
the executive committee shall be required for action
on all matters.
(c) Meetings of the executive committee shall be held
at such times and places as determined by the
chairman.
( d ) Representatives of member firms of the section may
attend meetings of the executive committee as ob
servers under rules established by the executive com
mittee. Such attendance will not be permitted
when the committee is considering disciplinary
matters.

(a)

VII.

Public Oversight Board
1.

S ize , A p p o i n t m e n t , R e m o v a l , a n d C o m p e n s a tio n

The public oversight board shall consist of five members.
Members of such board shall be drawn from among
prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation,
including, but not limited to, former public officials,
lawyers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators,
economists, and business executives.
Following its initial appointment, the public over
sight board shall, in consultation with and subject to the
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors, appoint, re
move, and set the terms and compensation of its members
and select its chairman. However, such board shall auto
matically terminate in the event of the termination of the
SEC practice section of the AICPA Division for Firms.
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2.

R e sp o n sib ilitie s a n d F u n ctio n s

The public oversight board shall—
(a)
Monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction
activities of the peer review and executive commit
tees to assure their effectiveness.
( h) Determine that the peer review committee is as
certaining that firms are taking appropriate action
as a result of peer reviews.
(c) Conduct continuing oversight of all other activities
of the section.
(d) Make recommendations to the executive committee
for improvements in the operations of the section.
(e )
Publish an annual report and such other reports
as may be deemed necessary with respect to its
activities.
(f) Engage staff to assist in carrying out its functions.
(g) Have the right for any or all of its members to
attend any meetings of the executive committee.

V III.

Peer Reviews
1. R e v i e w R e q u i r e m e n t s
Peer reviews of member firms shall be conducted every
three years or at such additional times as designated by
the executive committee.
2.

P eer R e v ie w C o m m itte e
(а)

C o m p o sitio n a n d a p p o in tm e n t

The peer review committee shall be a continuing
committee appointed by the executive committee
and shall consist of fifteen individuals selected from
member firms.
(b)

R e sp o n sib ilitie s an d fu n ctio n s

The peer review committee shall—
(1) Administer the program of peer reviews for
member firms.
(2) Establish standards for conducting reviews.
(3) Establish standards for reports on peer reviews
and publication of such reports.
(4) Recommend sanctions and other disciplinary
decisions (including whether the name of the
affected firm is published) to the executive
committee.
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(5)

Consult from time to time with the public
oversight board.
(6) Keep appropriate records of peer reviews which
have been conducted.

3.

P e e r R e v ie w O b jectives

The objectives of peer reviews shall be to determine
that—
(a)
Member firms, as distinguished from individuals,
are maintaining and applying quality controls in
accordance with standards established by the AICPA
Quality Control Standards Committee. Reviews for
this purpose shall include a review of working
papers rather than specific “cases.” (The existence
of “cases” in a firm might raise questions concerning
its quality controls.)
(b)
By reviewing the procedures of member firms, ap
propriate steps are being taken to gain proper as
surance about the quality of work done on those
portions of audits performed in other countries.
(c) Member firms are meeting membership require
ments.

IX.

Sanctions Against Firms
1.

A u t h o r i t y to I m p o s e S a n c tio n s

The executive committee shall have the authority to im
pose sanctions on member firms either on its own initia
tive or on the basis of recommendations of the peer re
view committee and shall establish procedures designed
to assure due process to firms in connection with dis
ciplinary proceedings.
2.

T y p e s o f S a n ctio n s

The following types of sanctions may be imposed on
member firms for failure to maintain compliance with
the requirements for membership:
(a) Require corrective measures by the firm including
consideration by the firm of appropriate actions
with respect to individual firm personnel.
(b)
Additional requirements for continuing professional
education.
(c) Accelerated or special peer reviews.
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Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
Monetary fines.
(f) Suspension from membership.
(g) Expulsion from membership.

(d)
(e)

X.

Financing and Staffing of Section
1.

S e c tio n Staff a n d M e e t i n g C o sts
(a)

(b)

2.

P u b lic O v e r s ig h t B o a r d a n d S p ecia l P r o je c ts
(a)
(b)

Xi.

The president of the AICPA shall appoint a staff
director and assign such other staff as may be re
quired by the section.
The cost of the section staff and normal meeting
costs shall be paid out of the general budget of the
AICPA.

The costs of the public oversight board and its staff
shall be paid out of the dues of the section.
The cost of special projects shall be paid out of the
dues of the section.

Relationship to Other AiCPA Segments
Nothing in the organizational structure and functions of this
section shall be construed as taking the place of or changing
the operations of existing senior committees of the AICPA
or the status of individual CPAs as members of the AICPA.
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